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a preference parameter in the government's objective function. We present a model where favors 
must be bought: they come from competing contributions. This model is compared with a 
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1. Introduction: A Theory of Favoritism in an International
Oligopoly
The strategic trade literature has contributed much to our under-
standing of the reasons why governments favor home …rms at the
expense of foreign …rms. However, there is another kind of favoritism
that has been observed yet not quite fully explained. We refer to fa-
voritism in favor of some foreign …rms, at the expense of some other
foreign …rms. In fact, governments quite often give di¤erential tax
treatments to di¤erent foreign …rms in the same industry1. This is
true both in the case where foreign …rms are located in di¤erent for-
eign countries and export to the home country, and in the case where
foreign-owned …rms produce in the home country. For example, un-
til 2001, in Canada, the three big car manufacturers2 whose parent
companies are in the US were favored at the expense of those3 whose
parent companies are in Japan: the …rst group was allowed to im-
port European cars (to resell them in Canada) without tari¤s, while
the second group must pay a 6% tari¤. As soon as this discrimina-
tion was abolished because it was struck down4 by the WTO, a new
form of favoritism was sought. The Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers
Association (CVMA) recently proposed that auto makers employing
more than 5000 people receive a 5% tax credit for new investment.
(The CVMA is a lobby group for the Big Three, to which Honda
Canada Ltd.and Toyota Canada Ltd. do not belong.) If this proposal
is adopted, Honda Canada Ltd. and Toyota Canada Ltd. will again
be a victim of discrimination5.
1According to Rodrick (1989), …rm-speci…c taxes and subsidies are more com-
mon than one thinks.
2Namely, DaimlerChrysler Canada Inc., Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd., and
General Motors of Canada Ltd.
3Namely Honda Canada Inc. and Toyota Canada Inc.
4See the Globe and Mail, April 16, 2002, page B10.
5See The Globe and Mail, April 16, 2002, pages B1 and B10. Honda employs
about 4600 Canadians at assembly plants in Alliston, Ontario, and head o¢ce in
Toronto. Toyota employs around 4000 Canadians at assembly plants in Cambridge,2
In this paper, we seek to explain why a government might want to
give favor to some foreign …rms and hurt other foreign …rms. Mod-
els that explain government behavior toward foreign …rms fall into
two major categories. The traditional view o¤ers the “benevolent
government model,” according to which the home government max-
imizes some social objective, by setting tax rates, or tari¤ rates. A
more modern view sees the government as reacting to pressure groups.
This view has given rise to the “political economy” approach of trade
polices. To model government behavior under this approach, a con-
venient way is to postulate that the government seeks to maximize a
political support function, without explicitly modelling the behavior
of pressure groups6. Alternatively, one can be more explicit about the
optimization behavior of pressure groups, by, for example, adopting
the common agency model proposed by Berheim and Whinston (1986).
In the context of international trade, Grossman and Helpman (1994)
posit pressure groups seeking protection as “principals” and the gov-
erment as their “common agency.” The principals non-cooperatively
o¤er the government a menu of payments conditional on actions that
the government may take. Such menus are called “contribution sched-
ules.” In the common agency model, favors come from competing
contributions.
We set up a common agency model to explain favors granted to
foreign …rms. Our model of common agency di¤ers from that of Gross-
man and Helpman, in that while they assume that all …rms are price-
takers, we speci…cally pay attention to the fact that in the case of
oligopoly, …rms know that their output levels a¤ect the price. This
adds a second dimension of rivalry to the common agency model.
When …rms with heterogeneous production costs seek favors, the equi-
librium structure of …rm-speci…c tari¤s (or subsidies) displays what
may be described as “favoritism”. We want to determine whether
higher cost …rms received less favored treatments, in the common
agency model. To sharpen our understanding of the structure of fa-
Ontario, parts operations in British Columbia, and head o¢ce in Totonto.
6See, for example, Hillman and Ursprung (1988), Long and Vousden (1991).3
vors we compare the results of our common agency model with the
benchmark model which posits that the government is benevolent.
The benchmark model and the common agency model that we set
up in this paper have several common characteristics. Both are pre-
sented as multistage games. In the last stage of the game (which we
call stage two), …rms take tax rates as given and compete as Cournot
rivals in the …nal good market. In the stage preceding the last stage
(which we call stage one), the home government chooses …rm-speci…c
tax rates, to maximize a certain objective function. In the bench-
mark model, stage one is the …rst stage of the game, and the objec-
tive of the government is to maximize social welfare. In the common
agency model, there is an earlier stage, which we call stage 0, in which
…rms take actions to in‡uence the government’s behavior in stage one.
Speci…cally, each of the rival …rms o¤ers the government a menu, or
contribution schedule, which states how much money it would give to
the government, according to how the government changes the price or
tax structure in the economy7. From each …rm’s point of view, favors
are not free goods. Firms must pay to get favors, in direct competition
with their rivals. It is this feature, which is absent in the benchmark
model, that gives rise to a structure of …rm-speci…c tari¤ rates that is
quite di¤erent from the structure obtained in the bechmark model.
By using an equilibrium approach that we develop speci…cally for
the analysis of oligopolistic market structure, we are able to obtain
remarkably simple tax formulas for the general case of ex-ante non-
identical …rms. We also link optimal tax formulas to concepts such as
concentration index and degree of heterogeneity of …rms, and interpret
optimal discriminatory taxes as a means of reducing the degree of
concentration of an industry. We show that the …rm-speci…c tari¤
formula in the common agency model di¤er from that obtained in the
benchmark model by a term which depends on both the relative weight
7The contributions are just pure transfers: they do not use up real resources.
For a model which deals with the implications of the use of real resources to in‡u-
ence government policies, see Hillman, Long and Soubeyran (2001). In this paper,
we will focus on the “contribution schedule”, or “common agency”, approach.4
of domestic social welfare in the government’s objective function, and
on the deviation of a …rm’s unit cost from the industry’s mean unit
cost. The two formula would be identical if the relative weight were
in…nite. In particular, we show that (i) for low cost foreign …rms,
the deviation of a …rm-speci…c tari¤ rate from the mean tari¤ rate
under lobbying, is smaller than the corresponding …rm-speci…c tari¤
rate from the mean tari¤ rate under a benevolent government, while
(ii) for high cost foreign …rms, the deviation of a …rm-speci…c tari¤
rate from the mean tari¤ rate under lobbying, is greater than the
corresponding …rm-speci…c tari¤ rate from the mean tari¤ rate under
a benevolent government. These results are intuitively appealing. Low
cost foreign …rms can a¤ord to bribe the government more than high
cost ones, and therefore are able to tilt the tari¤ structure in their
favors relative to the benchmark structure.
Two important features of our models are: (a) …rms are not identi-
cal, and (b) the government can give di¤erential treatments to di¤erent
…rms. The …rst feature, asymmetry in costs, has been studied by Col-
lie (1993, 1998) and Long and Soubeyran (1997a), but in these papers
it was assumed that the rate of tax or subsidy per unit of output must
be the same for all …rms. Di¤erential tax treatment was dealt with
in Long and Soubeyran (1997b) and Leahy and Montagna (1998), but
only in the traditional “social welfare maximization” framework. In
our model, we go a step further by being able to characterize the di-
rection of the favors given to …rms as function of the initial dispersion
of unit costs in the industry. We show that distributing favors and
harms is a means of changing the concentration of the international
oligopoly.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a
common framework for the analysis of Cournot equilibrium with an
asymmetric cost structure, and study the change in equilibrium out-
puts and pro…ts when the asymmetric cost structure is changed by
taxation. In section 3, we show how the objective function of the gov-
ernment can be represented in terms of a distance function of the tax
vector from a certain reference point and we derive the properties of5
the tax structure in the benchmark model. Section 4 shows that the
optimal tax structure in the benchmark model reduces the degree of
industry concentration. In Section 5, we formulate and analyse the
common agency model. The results are compared with those of the
benchmark model. Section 6 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2. Oligopoly and Cost Structure: An Equilibrium Approach
In the analysis of industries under perfect competition, it is often
convenient to use the indirect pro…t function: pro…t is expressed as a
function of the vector of prices of inputs and outputs. That approach
has proved to be both elegant and powerful. In this section, we show
how a similar approach can be developed for oligopoly, where equilib-
rium pro…t is expressed as a function of tax rates and input prices,
which the oligopolists take as given when they make their output de-
cisions. A number of formulas are generated which greatly simplify
the analysis of equilibrium responses in an oligopoly.
We consider an asymmetric oligopoly consisting of n …rms that
produce a homogenous good. Let N ´ f1;2;:::;ng: Let qi denotes
…rm i’s output, i 2 N. The inverse demand function is




i2N qi. Assume that the …rm i’s marginal cost of pro-
duction is independent8 of its output level qi . Denote this marginal
cost by c0
i: The …rm must also pay a tax ti per unit of output (if ti is
negative, the …rm receives an output subsidy). Here we allow the tax
(or subsidy) to be …rm-speci…c. The ‘modi…ed marginal cost’ of …rm
i is ci ´ c0
i + ti. Firm i’s pro…t is ¼i = Pqi ¡ ciqi .
We use a two-stage approach: in the …rst stage, tax rates are set,
and in the second stage, …rms, taking tax rates as given, compete as
Cournot rivals. We will begin our analysis by studying the equilibrium
in the second stage.
8The analysis can be extended to the case of non-constant marginal costs, see
Long and Soubeyran (2001a).6
2.1. Stage two: Cournot equilibrium
At the beginning of stage two, the variables ci have been deter-





0(Z)qi + P(Z) ¡ ci · 0 (1)




In addition, if qi > 0 then the second order condition is: P00(Z)qi +
2P 0(Z) · 0: This condition may be expressed as
2 ¡ siE ¸ 0 (3)
where E ´ ¡P 00(Z)Z=P 0(Z) is the elasticity of the slope of the demand
curve and si ´ qi=Z is …rm i’s market share.
We restrict attention to interior equilibria9. Assume (1) holds with
equality for all …rms, we sum these n equations to get
P
0(Z)Z + nP(Z) =
X
i2N
ci ´ C (4)
where C is the sum of the marginal costs. As pointed out by Bergstrom
and Varian (1985a), equation (4) shows that equilibrium industry out-
put depends only on the sum of the marginal costs.
De…ne the function
Ã(Z) = P
0(Z)Z + nP(Z); Ã(0) = nP(0) > 0
If Ã(Z) is a decreasing function and if there exists some Z# > 0 such
that Ã(Z) < 0 for all Z greater Z#, then (4) has a unique solution
9For a set of su¢cient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of Cournot
equilibrium, see Long and Soubeyran (2000).7
b Z = b Z(C) for each C in the interval nP(0) ¸ C ¸ 0. The condition
that Ã(Z) is strictly decreasing can be expressed as
E < n + 1 (5)
Condition (5) is also a familiar stability condition for Cournot equi-
libria (see Dixit (1986), for example). We are now ready to state a
few important lemmas10
Lemma 1: Equilibrium output b Z is determined by C and is inde-














Lemma 1 gives us a function b Z(C), which we now use to express
the equilibrium output of …rm i, and its pro…t, as a function of only
two parameters, C and ci. In what follows, we will use a hat to denote
equilibrium values.
Lemma 2:(The Equilibrium Pro…t Function): Firm i’s equi-
librium output is
b qi =
P(b Z(C)) ¡ ci
[¡P 0(b Z(C))]
´ b qi(ci;C) (7)
and its equilibrium pro…t is given by the following pro…t function:
b ¼i =
h









2 ´ b ¼i(ci;C)(8)
10Lemma 1 was stated in Bergstrom and Varian (1985a,b) who noted that several
authors had been aware of this result.8
Remark 1: The expressions11 in Lemma 2 are very useful, due to
the equilibrium approach embodied in the de…nitions of b ¼i(ci;C) and
b qi(ci;C): The equilibrium pro…t function b ¼i(ci;C) achieves consider-
able economies over the direct pro…t function ¦i(qi;Z;ci) ´ [P(Z) ¡
ci]qi. Furthermore it highlights a formal link between oligopoly theory
and the theory of contributions to a public good, as systematized by
Bergstrom et al. (1986).
Let us turn to equilibrium industry pro…t. Using Lemma 2, one
can prove the following result12:
Proposition 1( The Equilibrium Industry Pro…t Function):
Given the sum of marginal costs, C, average industry pro…t in a
Cournot equilibrium is a linear and increasing function of the vari-






VN(c;C) + [P(b Z(C)) ¡ (C=n)]2
[¡P0(b Z(C))]
´ b ¼N(c;C) (9)
where c ´ (c1;:::;cn) is the vector of marginal costs and VN(c;C) is



















(b P ¡ cN) ¡ (ci ¡ cN)
i2
Since C is kept constant, b P and ¡b P0 are constant. Summing the above








[2 ¡ siE] b qi
n + 1 ¡ E
> 0:
12 Proposition 1 was proved by Long and Soubeyran (1996) but the equilibrium
approach was not made explicit there. Bergstrom and Varian (1985a) obtained a
similar formula.9
Our next proposition links average equilibrium industry pro…t to
the Her…ndahl index of industry concentration. Recall that, if n is the







and that this index at its maximum (HN = 1) when there is just one
…rm in the industry (monopoly), and, given n, HN is at its minimum
(HN = 1=n2) when the …rms are identical:
Proposition 2:(Link between Industry Pro…t and the Her…nd-
ahl Index) Given the marginal cost sum C, the equilibrium industry
pro…t is an increasing function of the Her…ndahl index of concentra-
tion.
Proof: See the Appendix.
All of the above results can be modi…ed in a simple way if the set
N is partitioned into two subsets M and M¤ such that N = M [ M¤
and M\M¤ is the null set. To …x ideas, let M = f1;2;:::;mg be the set
of domestic …rms and M¤ = fm+1;::::;m+m¤g be the set of foreign





j2M¤ cj, C ´ mcM + m¤cM¤, Q ´
P
i2M qi ´ mqM
and Q¤ ´
P
j2M¤ qj ´ m¤qM¤.
2.2. Stage 1: Manipulation of marginal costs by taxation
We now turn to stage 1. In this stage the government seeks to
maximize a certain objective function, by setting …rm-speci…c taxes
to in‡uence equilibrium outputs in Stage 2. We will consider two types
of objective function, speci…ed for the benchmark model, and for the
common agency model.10
In the benchmark model, the government maximizes a weighted
sum of (i) domestic consumers’s surplus, (ii) the pro…ts of domestic




P(Z)dZ ¡ P(b Z)b Z
where b Z = b Z(C) in a Cournot equilibrium. The conventional social
welfare is
c W(c;C) ´ S(b Z(C)) + mb ¼M(c;C) + b T (11)
where b T is the tax revenue at the Cournot equilibrium (if b T is negative,
it is the subsidy costs) and b ¼M = (1=m)
P
i2M b ¼i. More generally, we
will consider the following objective function of the government:
c W(c;C) ´ ¯S(b Z(C)) + ¹mb ¼M(c;C) + ±b T (12)
where ± and ¹ are positive weights given to tax revenue and pro…ts
respectively. The parameter ¯ ¸ 0 is the weight given to consumers’
surplus. For example, if the goods are produced only for exporting to
a third country, and the home government does not care about the
foreign consumers’ surplus, then it sets ¯ = 0. On the other hand, if
all the output is sold in the home market, then it seems reasonable
to set ¯ = 1. If 0 < ¹ < 1; we may interpret this as corresponding
to a situation where all the m domestic …rms are partially owned by
foreigners. Here, the cost of manipulating marginal costs, by means
of …rm-speci…c subsidies to domestic …rms, is the leakage of the subsi-
dies to foreign shareholders of domestic …rms: The speci…cation that
± ¸ 1 may be justi…ed on the ground that the social cost of a dol-
lar of subsidy is greater than a dollar if such subsidies are …nanced
by distortionary taxes. The concept of marginal cost of public funds,
± > 1, is familiar to the students of public economics, and has re-
cently been imported into the literature on strategic trade policy (see
Neary (1994)). Here the costs of manipulating marginal costs is the
deadweight losses associating with raising distortionary taxes in other11
markets to subsidize the oligopolists. Notice that in (12), only the
ratios ¯=± and m=± matter, not the absolute values of ¯, ¹ and ±.
Therefore in what follows we will normalize by setting ± = 1.
In the common agency, we assume that the government is inter-
ested in contributions o¤ered by foreign …rms to in‡uence policies.
This will be spelled out in more detail in a later section.
In this paper, we focus on taxation of foreign …rms by the domestic
government. For a given objective function of the home government,
we wish to determine the optimal …rm-speci…c per unit tax, tj , j 2
M¤. To facilitate an intuitive comprehension of the nature of the
problem, and in particular, to sharpen the focus on the crucial issue
of asymmetric versus symmetric solutions, in what follows, we will
solve the stage 1 problem by using a two-step procedure.
In the …rst step, for a given average tax on the foreign …rms, tM¤ =
(1=M¤)
P
j2M¤ tj; we determine the optimal tj conditional on the
given tM¤. In the second step, we determine the optimal tM¤. It is the
…rst step that commands our attention here, because the question of
optimal asymmetric tax treatment for heterogenous …rms is not well
understood. The separation of the two steps has the ‡avor of the
traditional separation of income and substitution e¤ects in the theory
of the consumer, or the separation of cost minimization from pro…t
maximization in the theory of the …rm. In our heterogenous oligopoly
context, the decomposition separates the cost dispersion e¤ect (for a
…xed price) from the demand e¤ect of optimal taxes and subsidies.
3. The Benchmark Model: Benevolent Favoritism
In this model, there are m domestic …rms and m¤ foreign …rms.
They compete in the home market. The home government sets …rm-
speci…c tari¤s on foreign …rms’ products in order to maximize a con-
ventional welfare function, which is a weighted sum of (i) domestic
consumers’ surplus, (ii) pro…ts of home …rms, and (iii) tari¤ revenue.
We seek to determine the optimal structure of favors distributed to
foreign …rms: which foreign …rms are more favorably treated relative12
to other foreign …rms? The technique we use to …nd the answer to
this question is geometric and global: we show below that the optimal
structure of favors is determined by choosing a tari¤ vector on a cer-
tain convex set to minimize the distance between a reference vector
and the convex set. As will be explained below, the reference vector
is the vector of gross pro…t margins. The optimal tari¤ structure is
thus a projection of the reference vector on the convex set. The basic
steps are described below.
3.1. A transformation of the stage-one objective function
Let tj denote the tari¤ rate per unit of domestic imports from for-
eign …rm j 2 M¤. Let tM¤ = (1=m¤)
P
j2M¤ tj. Assume for simplicity
that there are no tax or subsidy on domestic outputs. Let c0
j denote




denote its tax-inclusive unit cots. Recall that we have, from Lemmas




j2M¤ cj we can write
equilibrium industry output as b Z = b Z(tM¤). Denote equilibrium price
by b P = P(b Z(tM¤)): Our task is to characterize the optimal …rm-
speci…c tari¤ vectors. For this purpose, it is useful to prove a number
of technical results. The following lemma expresses the stage 2 tari¤
revenue (in a Cournot equilibrium) as a distance function between the
vector of …rm-speci…c tari¤ rates t = (tm+1;:::;tm+m¤) and a reference










is an indicator of the gross pro…t margin of …rm j.
Lemma 3: (i) The tari¤ revenue in the Cournot equilibrium is





























(ii) The objective function of the home government, given by (12), can
be represented by the following distance function:







Á(tM¤) = Ã(tM¤) + ¯S(b Z(tM¤)) + ¹mb ¼M(tM¤): (17)
Proof: See the Appendix.
In the next sub-section we will make use of Lemma 3 to obtain an
insightful characterization of optimal tari¤ rates.
3.2. Characterization of the optimal tari¤s
Proposition 3: The benevolent government favors the ine¢cient
foreign …rms. In particular, optimal …rm-speci…c tari¤ per unit of
output is related to the mean tari¤ rate by the following formula











That is, the optimal tari¤ rates on high cost …rms are below the av-
erage, and the optimal tari¤s on low cost …rms are above the average.
The relationship between tax-inclusive marginal cost deviations and
pre-tax marginal cost deviations is given by











That is, …rm-speci…c tari¤ rates reduce the deviations from the mean
marginal cost.
Proof: See the Appendix.14
Remark 2: Equation (18) shows that in an international oligopoly,
higher costs foreign …rms receive a more favorable tari¤ treament than
lower cost ones. This re‡ects the reality of anti-dumping duties. Firms
with lower c0
j face higher tari¤ rates. To see the intuition behind
our result, consider the simple case where there are just two foreign
…rms, say h and k, and …rm h has lower cost: ch < ck. Then, for
a given tM¤, foreign industry output is …xed. For the sake of argu-
ment, suppose that initially the government does not optimize, and
sets th = tk = tM¤. Then …rm h will produce more than …rm k; and,
using Lemma 1,
qh ¡ qk =
1
[¡c P0]











and the tari¤ revenue will be
T = thqh + tkqk = tM¤qh + tM¤ [Q
¤(tM¤) ¡ qh]
Clearly, by raising th marginally above tM¤, by a small amount ²,
and at the same time reducing tk below tM¤by ², industry output and
price will be una¤ected, but tari¤ revenue will rise, because qh > qk.
A further increase in th (and decrease in tk) may be therefore increase
tari¤ revenue. Bearing in mind, however, that as th is raised, and
tk is reduced, the quantity qh will be adjusted downwards, and the
quantity qk will be adjusted upwards. Thus, for a given tM¤, there
is an optimal gap between th and tk. When the gap is optimally set,
then, from (18),
ch = th + c
0











Observe that the lower cost …rm still produces more than the higher
cost …rm.
4. Tari¤ Favors and Industry Concentration
In this section we provide another intuitive interpretation of the
tari¤ rule derived in the preceding section. We will do this by estab-
lishing a link between the Her…ndahl index of concentration of the15
foreign industry with the variance of the distribution of their tax-
inclusive marginal costs. Starting from the distribution of the tax-
exclusive marginal costs, the imposition of …rm-speci…c taxes or sub-
sidies change the concentration of the foreign industry. We have seen
from Proposition 2 that, with a given sum of marginal costs, i.e., C =
constant, equilibrium industry pro…t is an increasing function of the
industry Her…ndahl index.
Recall that N = f1;2;:::;ng is the set of all …rms in the indus-
try, and M¤ is a subset consisting of m¤ foreign …rms. Let qM¤ =
(1=m¤)
P




















and let ´M¤ denote the equilibrium average mark-up
´
¤
M = b P ¡ cM¤
where cM¤ = (1=m¤)
P
j2M¤ cj. The following lemma states an impor-
tant relationship between HM¤ and VM¤[c]:
Lemma 5: Given the sum of tax-inclusive marginal costs, C, the
Her…ndahl index HM¤ is an increasing function of the variance of the









Proof: See the Appendix.16
Lemma 6:Minimizing kt¡t¤k2 is the same as minimizing the variance
of the distribution of tax-inclusive marginal costs among foreign …rms.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Using Lemmas 5 and 6, we obtain an important characterization
of optimal frim-speci…c tari¤s for the benchmark model (benevolent
government.)
Proposition 4:(The anti-concentration motive theorem) Opti-
mal discriminatory tari¤s chosen by the benevolent government in the
benchmark model decrease the market power of the foreign industry.
5. Discriminatory tari¤s when foreign …rms are politically
active
In the preceding sections we dealt with the benchmark case in
which a principal (the government) manipulates the distribution of
tari¤-inclusive marginal costs among the foreign oligopolists, by means
of …rm-speci…c taxation. We now turn to a di¤erent model, in which
each foreign oligopolist non-cooperatively induces the government of
the importing country toset …rm-speci…c tari¤s that would harmit less
than other …rms. This model lies within political economy framework,
which challenges the conventional normative view of public policy13.
The foreign …rms are the principals, who incur a cost of (indirectly)
manipulating their rivals’ costs. This cost is the payment promised
to the agent (the government of the importing country). Each foreign
…rm o¤ers a contribution schedule to the agent. Thus, to get favors
is costly. Our objectives are to show that in an asymmetric oligopoly,
the equilibrium taxes or tari¤s are correlated to the tax-exclusive mar-
ginal costs and to compare the results of this model with those of the
benchmark model.
13For an excellent exposition, see Dixit (1996).17
5.1. A model of lobbying by foreign oligopolists
In modelling …rms as principals, we follow Grossman and Helpman
(1994), but our model is di¤erent from theirs in one important respect:
our …rms are not price-takers in the product markets. This gives rise
to an additional dimension of rivalry among the principals.
Like Grossman and Helpman, we use the common agency frame-
work developed by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), where there are
many principals but only one agent. We take the basic structure of
the section 3, and add another stage, called Stage 0, in which foreign
…rms each o¤er a contribution schedule ½j(t), where t is the vector of
…rm-speci…c tari¤ rates: t = (tm+1;::::tm+m¤), and b ¼j(tj;tM¤) denote
the equilibrium pro…t function of foreign …rm j 2 M¤ . Its net pro…t
is
Jj = b ¼j(tj;tM¤) ¡ ½j(t): (20)
The home government’s objective function is a weighted sum of the
domestic social welfare and the …nancial contributions that the gov-
ernment receives from the foreign …rms
J0 = µW +
X
j2M¤
½j(t), where µ > 1, (21)
where W is the conventional welfare measure of the home country,
which consists of domestic consumers’ surplus, pro…ts of domestic
…rms, and tari¤ revenue, and where µ is the weight the home govern-
ment assigns to this conventional welfare measure, perhaps because of
considerations such as the probability of being re-elected. We assume
that µ > 1 because it seems plausible that, to survive, the incumbent
government must place a lot of weight on domestic welfare. Also,
µ > 1 ensures that we have a concave problem, as will be seen shortly.
The game involves three stages. In Stage 0, foreign …rms o¤er
contribution schedules to the home government. In Stage 1; the home
government sets the tari¤ rates, and receives the contributions from
the foreign …rms. In Stage 2 (the …nal stage), the …rms take the tari¤
rates as given and compete à la Cournot.18
5.2. Correlation between tari¤ rates and marginal costs in the con-
tribution equilibrium
The equilibrium in Stage 2 has been described in section 2. Given
the vector t = (tm+1;::::tm+m¤), the equilibrium industry output is
b Z(tM¤) and forign …rm j’s pro…t is b ¼j (tj;tM¤) for j 2 M¤ . Domestic
…rm i’s pro…t is b ¼i(0;tM¤), because we assume that domestic …rms are
not politically active. Domestic consumers’ surplus is S(b Z(tM¤)) and
tari¤ revenue is given by (14).
In Stage 1, the government takes the contribution schedules o¤ered
by the foreign …rms as given, and seeks to maximize (21) by choosing
the tari¤ vector t. This yields the …rst order condition
rJ0 = µrc W(t) +
X
j2M¤
r½j(t) = 0 (22)
where rJ0 denotes the vector of partial derivatives @J0=@tj; for j =
m + 1;:::;m + m¤.
Turning now to Stage 0, we want to characterize the Nash equi-
librium in contribution schedules. Consider any foreign …rm k 2 M¤.
Given the contribution schedules of all other …rms j 2 M¤ ¡ fkg ´
M¤
¡k, consider …rm k ’s reasoning. If …rm k does not contribute (i.e., it
o¤ers the null schedule ½(:) ´ 0), we let ¿ denote the resulting vector





½j(¿) + µc W(¿) (23)
and …rm k’s payo¤ is b ¼k(¿).
If …rm k o¤er a non-null contribution schedule, let the resulting
vector of tari¤ rates be t; and the government’s payo¤ is
X
j2M¤
½j(t) + µc W(t) (24)19
while …rm k gets b ¼k(t) ¡½k(t). Clearly the choice of ½k(:) must max-














+[b ¼k(t) ¡ ½k(t)]¡b ¼k(¿)(25)




r½j(t) + rb ¼k(t) + rµc W(t) = 0 (26)
From (22) and (26),
r½k(t) = rb ¼k(t) (27)
This condition can be interpreted as requiring the equilibrium con-
tribution schedules to have the “local truthfulness” property. It says
that the additional payment that the …rm o¤ers to the government
for a marginal change in a tax rate must equal the …rm’s marginal
valuation of such a change. Since (27) must hold for all foreign …rms




rb ¼j(t) = 0
which, as can be seen from (20) and (21), is the …rst order condition




b ¼j(t) = J0(t) +
X
j2M¤
Jj(t) ´ -: (28)
This condition shows that the equilibrium is Pareto e¢cient from the
point of view of the set of actors consisting of the government and the
foreign …rms.20
Now let us assume for simplicity that domestic …rms do not receive
any subsidy or face any tax. Then - in (28) may be written as
- = µmb ¼M + µb S + µb T +
(






jb qj ¡ b T
)
(29)
where b T is the tari¤ revenue at the Cournot equilibrium, and b Q¤ = P
j2M¤ b qj. From (29), we get






where t = (tm+1;:::;tm+m¤) , t¤






j 8j 2 M¤, and
Á(tM¤) = µb S + µmb ¼M + µ
(
b P b Q
¤ +
µ









In order to obtain a neat characterization of …rm-speci…c tari¤
rates, we use here the two-step procedure explained in Section 3.2.
For any given tM¤, the maximization of (30) with respect to t subject
to
P
j2M¤ tj = m¤tM¤ is a concave problem (recall that µ > 1) and























Thus, the deviation of tax-inclusive marginal costs from their mean is








To compare the optimal tari¤ structure in this common agency
model with that obtained in the benchmark model, we use the super-
script L (for lobbying) and B (for benchmark, or benevolent govern-
ment) for the respective tari¤ rates. Then, using (18) and (32), we
obtain the following proposition:21
Proposition 5:
(i) For low cost foreign …rms, i.e., c0
j < c0
M¤, the deviation of a …rm-
speci…c tari¤ rate from the mean tari¤ rate under lobbying, tL
j ¡tL
M¤, is
smaller than the corresponding …rm-speci…c tari¤ rate from the mean



























(ii) For high cost foreign …rms, i.e., c0
j > c0
M¤, the deviation of
a …rm-speci…c tari¤ rate from the mean tari¤ rate under lobbying,
tL
j ¡ tL
M¤, is greater than the corresponding …rm-speci…c tari¤ rate



























(iii) If 1 < µ < 2, the lower cost foreign …rms will be taxed at a
lower rate.
Remark: Proposition 5 is intuitively appealing. Low cost foreign
…rms can a¤ord to bribe the government more than high cost ones,
and therefore are able to tilt the tari¤ structure in their favors relative
to the benchmark structure.
5.3. Equilibrium contribution schedules: global characterization
In the preceding sub-section, we characterized the local properties
of the equilibrium contribution schedules. We now turn to a global
characterization. To do this we now add the assumption that the
demand function is linear. It follows that the equilibrium pro…t func-
tions are quadratic in tari¤ rates, and one can verify that equilibrium
contribution schedules are linear.
Let …rm j’s contribution schedule take the form







j(a constant, to be determined) is the marginal incentive of-
fered by …rm j to the government in exchange for an increase in the
tari¤ rate on …rm k’s output, and Fj is a …xed intercept to shift the









denote sum of the incentive payments o¤ered by all foreign …rms to
the government for a marginal increase on the tari¤ rate on …rm k’s
output. Similarly, let F ´
P
j2M¤ Fj. For simplicity, in what follows
we assume there are no taxes or subsidies on domestic …rms. Then
equilibrium industry output depends only on tM¤:The government’s
objective function becomes





where W(t;tM¤) is given by (16). For a quick result on the struc-
ture of equilibrium …rm-speci…c tari¤s, it is convenient to solve the
maximization problem (37) in two steps. First, for a given tM¤, we
choose the vector t = (tm+1;:::;tm+m¤) to maximize J0(t) subject to P
j2M¤ tj = m¤tM¤. The second step consists of choosing tM¤. The
…rst step yields:
Proposition 6:
In a lobbying equilibrium, the tari¤s on foreign …rms satisfy the
following condition











j ¡ RM¤) (38)
where RM¤ ´ (1=m¤)
P
j2M¤ Rj.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remark: (38) may seem di¤erent from (32). There is however no
di¤erence when we have solved for Rj and RM¤.(This will be done23
below.) Comparing (38) with (18), we see that the e¤ect of the con-
tribution schedules is to modify the deviation of the tari¤ rate on …rm
j from the average tari¤ rate by an amount which re‡ects how much
additional contribution the home government gets by increasing tj.
We now solve for Rj. Let C0 ´
P
k2N c0
k, then we have C =
C0 + mtM + m¤tM¤. (Recall that tM ´
P
i2M ti, tM¤ ´
P
j2M¤ tj.)
We begin by noting that if the demand is linear, P = a ¡ bZ, then
from Lemma 2, equilibrium industry output, price, and outputs of








a + C ¡ (n + 1)cj
b(n + 1)
(39)




b(n + 1)2 [a + C ¡ (n + 1)cj]
2























From (38) we can express tj as a function of tM¤, Rj, and RM¤:
tj = fj(tM¤;R
j;RM¤) (40)
Substituting this into J0 and di¤erentiating the resulting expression


















where b Z, b Q, and b Q¤ are linear functions of tM¤. Therefore equation
(41) yields
tM¤ = g(RM¤): (42)










Note that the system of equations (43) is invertible to obtain
R
j = ¯j(t); j 2 M
¤ (44)
We now turn to Stage 0, and determine the equilibrium contribu-









which is the sum of marginal contributions by all foreign …rms other
than k if the government increases the tari¤ on …rm j’s output, j 2




k. Consider the bilateral surplus between
…rm k and the government. If …rm k o¤ers the null schedule ½k(:) ´ 0,
then Fk = 0, and ½
j
k = 0 for all j 2 M¤. In that case, let ¿ =









Fj + µc W(¿;¿M¤) (45)













Fj + µc W(t;tM¤) (46)
where tj is given by (43). The gain to the government from having a

















ktj ¡ Fk ¡ b ¼k(¿k;¿M¤) (48)







b ¼k(tk;tM¤) ¡ b ¼k(¿k;¿M¤) + µc W(t;tM¤) ¡ µc W(¿;¿M¤) (49)
where tj = hj(Rj;RM¤), as given by (43). Firm k then chooses ½
j
k,
j 2 M¤, to maximize (49), and then set Fk just high enough to ensure
that the government accepts the deal (ie, just high enough so that
(47) is zero). For given R
j
¡k for all j 2 M¤ (which are taken as having





k ) amounts to the direct choice of the vector
t = (tm+1;:::;tm+m¤).
Di¤erentiating S in (49) with respect to tj totally (ie, tM¤ , de-
…ned as(1=m¤)
P














































where ±jk = 1 if j = k and ±jk = 0 if j 6= k. Now the left-hand side of
(51) is equal to zero due to (41) and (38). Therefore
½
j







(It can be veri…ed that the right-hand side of (52) is the total derivative



















Combining this equation with (38) we obtain the relationship among
equilibrium tari¤ rates:











which is, of course, the same as (32). We can therefore state:
Proposition 7: The global approach and the local approach yield
identical results.
Remark: The advantage of the global approach is that it is easy






This equation and (42) determine tM¤. Finally, having found the equi-
librium tari¤ rates, we can determine the equilibrium output of each
…rm, and from this we can calculate ½k
j using (52).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have used the “common agency” approach to ex-
plain and characterize the equilibrium distribution of favors and harms
when the government can use …rm-speci…c tari¤ rates, and compare
the results with the benchmark model of welfare maximization. Ac-
cording to the benchmark approach, the government is the principal
and …rms are agents.We found that, in the benchmark model, the27
…rms whose costs are below the industry average face higher than av-
erage tari¤ rates. Thus, benevolent favoritism favors ine¢cient foreign
…rms relative to e¢cient foreign …rms. The common agency approach
reverses the roles of the players: foreign …rms are principals and the
government is their common agent. The low cost …rms will try to
attenuate the discrminations against them, by o¤ering contributions.
Thus, the equilibrium in the common agency game displays a di¤er-
ent tari¤ structure. In fact, for 1 < µ < 2, under the common agency
equilibrium, foreign …rms that have higher costs will face higher tari¤
rates. This is because lower costs …rms are able to bribe the govern-
ment more e¤ectively.
In order to focus on cost heterogeneity, we have assumed that there
is no informational asymmetry. Dealing with both types of asymmetry
is the next item in our research agenda.28
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2:






























This completes the proof.¤
Proof of Lemma 3:










b P ¡ cj
[¡c P0]
Let yj = b P ¡ cj and y0
j = b P ¡ c0
j:Then cj ¡ c0
j = y0
j ¡ yj and (cj ¡
c0
j)(b P ¡ cj) = (y0












































2 , then ½j ¡ cj = t¤
j ¡ tj. This
completes the proof.29
Proof of Proposition 3 (The geometry of tari¤s in an asym-
metric oligopoly: projecting on a hyperplane)
The objective function in the benchmark model has an important
characteristic: the equilibrium price b P, and the associated c P0, depend
only on the mean tax rate tM¤and is independent of the individual
values tj. In addition, the function Á(:) given by (17) depends only on







2 + Á(tM¤) (55)
(where in our special case ® = ¡1, see (16)). The maximization is
subject to








b P ¡ c
0







The separable structure of this problem suggests that an e¢cient res-
olution involves a two-step procedure. In the …rst step, we …x tM¤
(and thus …xing b P and c P0) and maximize J with respect to the vector
t = (tm+1;:::;tm+m¤) subject to (57) and (58). In the second step, we
choose tM¤:
This two-step procedure has an obvious economic interpretation.
Given a …xed tM¤, the industry output is …xed and therefore the price
is …xed. This allows us to concentrate on the e¤ect of tax rates on
the composition (as distinct from level) of industry output. This step
shows how discriminatory taxes on the outputs of ex-ante asymmetric30
…rms serve to minimize the total cost (not just production cost, as the
total cost may include cost of public …nance, and/or political support
cost) of a given industry output. The second step isolates the e¤ect of
the average tax on industry output, taking into account the properties
of the demand function.
As we will see below, our approach allows an intuitive and global
resolution, with a clear geometric interpretation. Calculus is not re-
quired.
Given tM¤, de…ne the hyperplane H(tM¤) by:





Also, de…ne the hypercube K(tM¤) by:
K(tM¤) = f(tm+1;:::;tm+m¤) : b P(tM¤) ¡ c
0
j ¡ tj ¸ 0g
This set ensures that all outputs are non-negative. The intersection
of these two sets is a closed and convex set. The …rst step in the
resolution can be stated formally as:
max
t ®kt ¡ t
¤k
2 ; t 2 H(tM¤) \ K(tM¤) (60)
The solution of this problem depends on the sign of ®. In the
problem formulated in the preceding section, ® is negative14.
Since in the present model ® < 0, the solution of (60) consists of
…nding in the set H(tM¤) \ K(tM¤) a point t that is closest to the
reference point t¤. In other words, the optimal solution is simply a
14In the case ® > 0 we obtain the following proposition .
Proposition F1:(Unequal treatment of equal agents)
If ® > 0 then a corner solution is obtained. This implies that even if …rms are
ex-ante identical, they will be given non-identical treatments.
(The case ® > 0 applies if we are dealing with taxation of domestic …rms , with
0 < ¹ < 1.)31
projection of the reference point t¤ onto the set H(tM¤)\K(tM¤): See
Figure 1.
PLEASE PLACE FIGURE 1 HERE.
Since this is an important result, some elaboration is given below.
Lemma 4:
Let ^ t be the projection of t¤ on the convex set H(tM¤) \ K(tM¤):
Then ^ t is given by the following formula:
^ t = t
¤
+ (tM¤ ¡ t
¤
M¤):u (61)






Write t¤ = ^ t + (t¤ ¡^ t). Since ^ t is the projection of t¤ on the
set H(tM¤) \ K(tM¤), it must be the case that t¤ ¡ ^ t =½(1;1;:::;1)
for some ½. Thus t¤
j = b tj + ½ for all j 2 M¤: From
P
j2M¤ tj =
m¤tM¤ we get m¤tM¤ =
P
j2M¤ tj ¡ m¤½ or ½ = t¤
M¤ ¡ tM¤. Then
tj = t¤
j ¡(t¤
M¤ ¡tM¤);for all j 2 M¤. This gives the result. The above
result is illustrated in Figure 1: the optimal solution^ t is the projection
of the reference point t¤ on the convex set H(tM¤) \ K(tM¤):
Using lemma 4, the proof of proposition 3 follows from (13) and
(61).





















































where cj = c0
j + tj, (cj ¡ cM¤)2 = [(c0
j ¡ c0
M¤) + (tj ¡ tM¤)]2. Hence
V arM¤(c) = V arM¤(c
0) + V arM¤(tj) + 2covM¤(c
0;t) (62)





















2 + V arM¤(t
¤) (63)





and that tj ¡ t¤
j = tM¤ ¡ (1=2)(c¤
j ¡ c¤
M¤) ¡ (1=2)(b P(tM¤) ¡ c0
j). by
Proposition 3.




2 = V arM¤(c) ¡ V arM¤(c
0) ¡ 2covM¤(c






















2 = V arM¤(c) ¡ V arM¤(t
¤)
and hence, for a given tM¤, minimizing kt ¡ t¤k2 is equivalent to
minimizing V arM¤(c).
Proof of Proposition 6:33
Write the Lagrangian for problem (37) as

































Summing (64) over all j 2 M¤, we get













Substituting (66) into (64) we get (38).
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